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Recently there has been growing dissatisfaction in Britain about the structure of
regulation in the securities industry. Traditionally it has been left a law unto itself,
with legal regulation rarely intervening [I]. The reasons are largely historic and are
of little relevance except with regard to one vital factor: the "village atmosphere of
the City of London". Bred not only through proximity but also through a common
heritage and class system, this facet of the City casts the various sections of the
industry in the form of "gentlemen's clubs". Although the ethics of the City might
have been higher in theory than in practice, transgressions from the accepted norms
of the group were visited with severe professional and social sanctions [2]. With the
changed economic situation and, possibly, the break-up of clearly defined social
groupings in British society [3], this capacity for the City to keep its own house in
order has probably weakened.
Certain aspects of the securities industry are regulated by law, particularly with
regard to the licensing of securities dealers and in the field of insurance. Even in
such areas as these, however, considerable emphasis is still placed on self-regulation.
It is, for example, not necessary for a securities dealer to obtain a license if he is,
inter alia, a member of certain recognized self-regulatory bodies. It is not possible
to describe in a short article the present regulatory structure in operation in Britian,
since it is far too complex [4]: it is a curious amalgam of official and semi-official
regulatory bodies, such as the Department of Trade, Bank of England, Metropolitan
and City of London Company Fraud Department, Council of the Stock Exchange,
and a host of associations and professional bodies. It may be of greatest interest to
fasten upon one of these agencies which, perhaps more than any other, typifies the
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role and nature of self-regulation in Britain. This is the City Panel on Take-overs
and Mergers.
1. The City Panel on Take-overs and Mergers and the City Code on Take-overs and
Mergers
The great boom in take-over and merger activity in the mid 1950's showed that
the then-existing structure of regulation was wholly unable to restrain the excesses
perpetrated in the frenzied climate of contested take-overs [5]. It has been ob-
served that
[B]ittemess and division ran deep. The network of gentility and politeness broke down com-
pletely. Far from keeping in touch with each other, the opposing merchant banks indulged in
personal animosity ... [the worst aspect of the matter ... was that the public had a ringside
seat to observe that when it came down to ethics and propriety the top figures of the City ...
were at each others' throats [6].
Under a great deal of internal as well as external pressure, the Governor of the Bank
of England called together a number of leading City institutions to create the City
Working Party, which drew up the Notes on Amalgamations of British Businesses
[7]. Whilst the Notes were hardly radical, the London Stock Exchange greeted
them as "an early shot in the campaign to get rid of the unethical, and to prevent
operations which at best might be viewed with distaste" [8j. The Notes were little
more than a code of good practice but did emphasize the need for equality of treat-
ment among shareholders, the making of reasonable corporate disclosures and the
avoidance of undue disruption of the securities markets.
Abuses continued, however [9]. The City Working Party was reconvened, and in
1963 the Revised Notes on Company Amalgamations and Mergers were published
[10]. The most interesting addition was the attention that the Notes gave to insider
trading. In particular the need for "timely and equal information on all relevant
matters ... to all the shareholders" was underlined. It should be noted that the
Notes did not expressly forbid insider trading although this was probably the fair
implication of the various principles the Notes expressed. Although the Board of
Trade had issued its Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules [11] in 1960
(which imposed a degree of regulation on take-overs and on the issuance of circulars
in which licensed dealers were involved), within a year or so of the promulgation of
the Revised Notes a number of take-over battles and market operations occurred
which substantially destroyed the City's attempt. at self-regulation [12].
There followed widespread disquiet and loud calls for the establishment of a
regulatory body of the kind typified by the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission. The City Working Party was reconvened "as a matter of urgency"
[13], and within a month the Governor of the Bank of England announced that
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agreement had been reached among the City institutions to set up a panel to admin-
ister a new code on corporate amalgamations [141, under the chairmanship of a
former deputy governor of the Bank of England. The Panel on Take-overs and
Mergers was established in March, 1968.
The Panel consisted of nine persons nominated from the various constituent City
institutions, with a relatively small secretariat provided by the Bank of England
[15]. From the outset the Panel made it clear that apart from acting as a super-
visory body it was available for consultation and advice [161. Whilst acknowledging
the dangers of being accused of bias and of creating confusion, the Panel also made
it clear that it would adopt an active and interventionist approach and not remain
merely a passive onlooker. Almost immediately the Panel was faced with a series of
dramatic and extremely difficult cases where its authority was openly challenged by
certain City institutions. One important sanction available to the Panel was referral
of a particular case to one of its constituent bodies, with the expectation that dis-
ciplinary proceedings would be taken against the individuals concerned. However,
the constituent institutions were not always prepared to do this or at least did not
act with sufficient enthusiasm [17], and the ability of the Panel to fulfill its role
was hampered. This absence of any effective sanctions did not go unrecognized.
Lord Kearton, the Chairman of Courtaulds, in a television interview on June 27,
1968, aptly observed,
[T]he cult of the gifted amateur is the new Take-over Panel's main defect. It has no teeth, no
legal sanctions - in fact to me it's all a kind of confidence trick.
The Governor of the Bank of England issued several press releases warning the
City that the present state of affairs would not be allowed to continue. In an open
letter to the City the Governor stated,
[T]he result ... has been less than satisfactory. Much resentment has been aroused. The Panel's
rulings have been questioned and even their general authority has not always been acknowl-
edged. It is in no one's interest that this state of affairs should continue.
Disquiet in Parliament grew [18] and it was obvious that the scheme of regulation
would have to be strengthened. It is doubtful whether the then Labour Govern-
ment would have wished to see a statutory securities and exchange commission im-
posed. The Prime Minister at the Lord Mayor's Guildhall Banquet made it clear that
he would prefer to see the City keep its own house in order [19], and plans were
made to strengthen self-regulation.
The Panel was reorganized and reconstituted under Lord Shawcross and an
Appeals Committee was set up under Lord Pearce [20]. Furthermore, a full-time
Executive under a Director General was created, with the members essentially prac-
titioners in the securities industry and related fields and, in the main, appointed on
a basis of secondment from the various City institutions. This was to ensure a
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degree of topical expertise and practical ability which would not normally be avail-
able in a regulatory agency of this type.
The most important development was the Panel's promulgation of a Statement
of Policy which had been drawn up vith the support of the various constituent
institutions and endorsed by the Board of Trade. This statement, whilst affirming
adherence to the principles of self-regulation, stated that there was a need to
place beyond doubt the Panel's determination that the voluntary system should both function
effectively and command the respect of all those concerned with it.
The Statement announced that the Panel would have increased powers to see to the
imposition of sanctions.
If there is a breach of the Code the Panel will have recourse to private or to public censure
[21], or in more flagrant cases to further action designed to deprive the offender temporarily or
permanently of his ability to practice in the field of take-overs and mergers.
The Panel's powers were strengthened by the Council of the Stock Exchange, which
altered its rules so as to provide that a determination of the Panel with regard to the
Code would be automatically accepted as binding by the Council, although the dis-
ciplinary sanction would remain within the Council's discretion [22]. Where
licensed dealers are involved in a violation of the "letter and spirit of the Code", the
Statement made it clear that if
the breach ... was of such a nature that public reprobation might not be an adequate sanction,
the Panel would report the matter to the Board of Trade inviting them to take the report into
consideration with a view to the possibility of action under the Prevention of Frauds (Invest-
ment) Act 1958 (i.e.. the revocation of a license or exemption).
The Statement added that the Panel had been assured by the Board of
Trade that "they will take into prompt consideration the facts relevant
to the exercise of their powers disclosed in any such report by the
Panel".
The Statement also referred to the possibility of the Panel requesting the Stock
Exchange to suspend trading in a particular security or even to delist the issuer. In
addition, in transactions involving exchange control permission, the Panel stated
that it would keep in close contact with the relevant officials in the Bank of Eng-
land so as to ensure "that the conditions under which consent is granted are prop-
erly observed".
One of the basic principles of the Code is that "to be effective the system cannot
be static and inflexible and from time to time its revision will be necessary in the
light of experience" [23]. In its present form the Code consists of a series of four-
teen General Principles implemented by thirty-nine detailed Rules. From time to
time the Panel issues so-called Practice Notes embodying rulings and interpretations
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of certain of the General Principles as well as of the Rules. The Notes are "intended
to serve as a guide only and are subject to amendment in the light of experience"
[24]. To illustrate the impact that the Code and authority of the Panel have had,
this article will trace the experience of the Panel in one small area of its concern,
insider trading.
2. The Panel, the Code and the regulation of insider trading
Insider trading in corporate securities is not unlawful in the United Kingdom
[25], although it may soon be in specific circumstances under Part V of the Com-
panies Bill 1978 [26]. Clause 57 of this Bill will make it a criminal offense to
knowingly make use of, or tip, price-sensitive information which is not generally
available and which the trader or tipper has obtained through his insider position
or knowingly from an insider. However, it should be noted that this offense covers
trading only on the Stock Exchange and on certain other anonymous markets, such
as that provided by ARIEL [27]. No provision is made for any form of civil liabil-
ity for insider trading in such circumstances. In the case of non-market transactions,
even in listed securities, the insider must disclose his insider status, not his inside
information. If an insider fails to do this, apart from committing a criminal offense,
his non-disclosure is constituted a deliberate misrepresentation [281. The common
law does not appear to cast a duty upon corporate fiduciaries as such [29], when
dealing in the securities of their companies, to make adequate disclosures of any
price-sensitive information that they might possess [30]. Of course, it is probable
that in certain circumstances corporate fiduciaries would be accountable to their
corporations on the basis of the "secret profits" rule [31], or possibly for breach of
confidence [32]. Since 1948 the Companies Acts have contained provisions, which
have been constantly reinforced and strengthened, requiring directors to report
their transactions to the company [33]. Thus apart from the obligation on directors
to disclose their dealings in their companies' securities, the regulation of insider
trading in Britain has been wholly a matter of self-regulation. Moreover, although
insider trading is not, of course, confined to take-overs and mergers, its regulation
has been almost solely dependent upon the Code [341.
To the degree that they aim to achieve equality of information to shareholders,
all the provisions of the Code are relevant to insider trading. Attention will be given
here only to those provisions directly in point. In the Introduction to the Code, it is
made clear that "the City Code has not and does not seek to have the force of
Law", that it merely represents "the collective opinion of those professionally con-
cerned in the field of take-overs and mergers on a range of business standards". The
observance of the Code is the price that must be paid for having the facility of the
securities markets. The Code states that, whilst it applies primarily to those actively
engaged in the securities industry, it
will also apply to directors of public companies or persons or groups of persons who seek to
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gain control ... of public companies, and professional advisers ... even where -they are not
directly affiliated to the bodies who are responsible for this document [35].
Although prima facie it might seem that the Paners sanctions extend only to pub-
licly listed companies, all commercial enterprises eventually have to look to the
City institutions for finance, at least to some extent, and will thus subject them-
selves to the Code. Indeed ARIEL has already agreed to require strict observance
of the Code by its subscribers and listed companies [36]. The Code itself states,
The City Code is drafted with listed public companies particularly in mind. Nevertheless, the
spirit of the City Code and where appropriate the letter will also apply to take-overs of unlisted
public companies. The City Code will not apply, however, to cases where the offeree company
is a private company, nor will it normally apply to take-overs of companies which are not
resident for exchange control purposes in the United Kingdom [37].
The basic rule underlying the Code (and to that extent also the Rules and Regu-
lations of the Stock Exchange) is expressed in General Principle 5:
It must be the object of all the parties to a take-over or merger transaction to use every
endeavor to prevent the creation of a false market in the shares of the offeror or offeree com-
pany [38].
In addition to emphasizing the need for equality of treatment and that "no rele-
vant information" should be withheld from shareholders in a take-over or merger
[39], the Code provides, in General Principle 10, that during the course of a take-
over or merger, or when such is in contemplation, neither the offeror, offeree nor
their respective advisers are to provide information to some shareholders which is
not made available to all shareholders [40]. This does not apply to the furnishing of
information in confidence, by the offeree company to a bona fide potential offeror,
or vice versa. Nor does it apply to the issuance of circulars by members of the Stock
Exchange, who are brokers to a participant in the transaction, to their investment
clients provided the issue has been cleared in advance by the Panel.
The Panel has on a number of occasions expressed concern at the privileged dis-
closure of price-sensitive information to selected shareholders. In support of Gen-
eral Principle 10 the Panel has issued a Practice Note on the Publication of Informa-
tion [41]. In this Note the Panel does not preclude the possibility of corporate
managements holding briefings for shareholders provided certain safeguards are
observed. Basically such a meeting should not take place until the offer document
has been published and the offeree company has published its views. All share-
holders should be sent invitations to the meeting, but in exceptional circumstances
the Panel may be prepared to accept a general invitation to shareholders advertised
in the press. The press and news agencies should always be invited to such meetings
and if at the meeting any material information previously undisclosed is made avail-
able, a circular giving details should be sent to the shareholders immediately. In
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certain circumstances, such as in the closing stages of a take-over bid, disclosure
through newspaper advertisements might be required. Given the difficulty of
explaining complex financial issues in the media, the Panel prefers that disclosure of
price-sensitive information be by circulars rather than by television or radio. Where
any such information is disclosed in a radio or television interview the Practice Note
imposes an obligation on the persons concerned to circularize the shareholders. The
Panel does not wish to prevent brokers who are associated with participants in a
take-over from giving their own clients material on the companies involved in the
transaction, but in all events fresh information must not be restricted to a small
privileged group. In particular information to clients should not include any state-
ments of fact or opinion based upon otherwise unavailable information. Finally,
clearance of circulars by the Panel is generally required.
Certain provisions of the Code are directly relevant to insider trading in the
context of take-over and merger transactions. Rule 7 emphasizes "the vital im-
portance of absolute secrecy before an announcement". However, under Rule 5, a
firm intention to make an offer must be disclosed to the shareholders as soon as it
is communicated to the board [42]. Where approaches have been made which
might lead to an offer, as soon as the parties are reasonably confident as to the
successful outcome of the negotiations a release should be made. Rule 5 further
provides that
In any situation which might lead to an offer being made ... a close watch should be kept on
the share market; in the event of an untoward movement in share prices an immediate
announcement, accompanied by such comment as may be appropriate, should be made.
In April, 1977 the Panel and the Stock Exchange sought to reinforce these pro-
visions by publishing a Joint Statement on the Announcement of Price-Sensitive
Matters. In this Statement the Panel and the Stock Exchange observed that in their
experience where trading had taken place upon the basis of inside information, it
had been by tippees and persons dealing upon the basis of rumors, and not by
insiders. Thus the problem was essentially one of security and confidentiality.
Where such a number of persons is involved as to render confidentiality difficult
to maintain, the company concerned should make a public announcement. Further-
more, the Joint Statement underlines the importance of companies developing
internal guidelines and procedures for its employees and executives with regard to
the handling of confidential information. Reference was also made to Section 4(g)
of the Stock Exchange's Listing Agreement under which listed issuers are obliged to
disclose to the Stock Exchange "any ... information necessary to enable the share-
holders and the public to appraise the position of the company and to avoid the
establishment of a false market in its securities". The Stock Exchange also indicated
that it would be far more prepared to halt trading temporarily where it was evident
that material undisclosed information was in the market.
The current edition of the Code (1976) significantly tightens up earlier provi-
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sions relating specifically to insider trading. Rule 30 provides,
All persons concerned with the consideration and discussion of any proposed offer must treat
the information related to the potential offer as secret and must not pass it to any other person
unless it is necessary to do so. Furthermore, such persons must conduct themselves so as to
minimize the chances of an accidental leak of information.
Whilst this restriction arose by implication from the provisions of an earlier edition
of the Code (1974), the rule against insider trading and tipping was not explicit.
The present Rule continues:
No dealings of any kind (including option business) in the securities of the offeree company by
any person, not being the offeror, who is privy to the preliminary take-over or merger discus-
sions or to an intention to make an offer may take place between the time when there is reason
to suppose that an approach or an offer is contemplated and the announcement of the
approach or offer or the termination of the discussions [43].
Furthermore,
[N]o such dealings shall take place in the securities of the offeror except where the proposed
offer is not deemed price sensitive in relation to such securities.
Without prejudice to the generality of the above provisions, the Code in Rule 30
provides that certain persons shall be regarded as being privy to the inside informa-
tion, "assuming he has received the relevant information". These are: a director or
employee of the companies involved in the transaction, a professional adviser either
to one of the companies or to a director or employee of such a company, and a
person who receives the information "in the context of a confidential relationship
and it was necessary that he received such information". Furthermore, the spouses,
close relatives and related trusts of such persons are deemed to be in the same posi-
tion as those persons.
It should be noted that the offeror is not precluded from acquiring securities in
the offeree company during this period. It seems that the Panel considers that
where the potential offeror is not in possession of inside information other than its
own intentions it should not necessarily be barred from trading [441. However, in
Practice Note 9, the Panel specifically states that this exemption
does not apply to cases where the offeror would be precluded from dealing under ordinarily
accepted standards of business behaviour, e.g. where the offeror has been supplied by the
offeree company with confidential price-sensitive information in the course of take-over or
merger discussions.
Many potential offeree companies and their professional advisers will give confi-
dential information to potential offerors only on the understanding that it is
treated as secret and confidential; this is apparently commonly a contractual obliga-
tion.
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Where an announcement has been made that the companies are negotiating for a
take-over or merger, or that an approach is likely, and the discussions are thereafter
terminated or no firm offer is made, no dealings in the securities of the offeree
company by the offeror (or by any persons or companies privy to the intention to
terminate the discussions or to the decision not to proceed with the offer) may take
place prior to the public announcement that the discussions have been terminated
or that there will be no offer [45].
Although Rule 30 establishes absolute prohibitions against dealings during pre-
liminary states of a take-over or merger transaction, Rule 31 asserts that "Is]ave in
so far as appears from the Code, it is considered undesirable to fetter the market".
Accordingly the Rule provides for freedom of dealing in the shares of the offeror or
offeree companies by parties to such a transaction (or by their associates) during
the offer period. However, this freedom is made subject to a requirement that the
dealings be disclosed to the Stock Exchange, the Panel and the press. The methods
and details of the required disclosures are elaborated in Practice Note 7.
3. Recent insider trading cases
The Panel and its Executive have consistently maintained that the incidence of
insider trading is exaggerated, particularly by the press. Nevertheless the Panel has
considered a number of cases of alleged insider trading with varying degrees of
success. There has been a conscious attempt to avoid the creation of a precedent
system, so the Panel's published statements of these cases are not necessarily
authoritative as to future cases.
One of the first cases that the Panel had to deal with in the context of insider
trading was that of Norbury Insulation [46]. Norbury Insulation, which was con-
trolled by Woods, made a bid for Hayeshaw Ltd. Previous to the public announce-
ment, Wiltshire Investments (which held the investments of a number of overseas
family trusts of which Woods was the settlor and principal beneficiary) made a
series of significant purchases through the Earl of Norbury, a stock broker. When
Norbury Insulation subsequently realized that Hayeshaw's earnings were not up
to their expectations, the company sought to withdraw the bid; Woods, through
Lord Norbury managed to "off load" a considerable amount of stock. However,
when the Panel refused permission to withdraw the bid, Lord Norbury started pur-
chasing again on behalf of Woods.
The Earl's contention that this trading had occurred as a result of his own discre-
tion in managing the trust funds was rejected by the Panel. Woods and the Earl then
claimed that they had been unaware of the requirements of the Code and had
violated Rules 30 and 31 in ignorance. The Panel also rejected these claims.
Furthermore, the Panel observed that despite the precise rules in the Code the
transactions were of such a nature "that according to the ordinary canons of pro-
priety, they ought never to have been undertaken".
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As a result of this investigation, the Stock Exchange Council banned the Earl
from dealing for six months and censured four of his partners. The Panel censured
Woods and pressured him to resign from his position as director of Norbury.
(Woods was reappointed to the board a year later.)
In D.F. Lyons and Co. Ltd. [47], the Panel considered the application of insider
trading rules to non-offeror third parties. D.F. Lyons was a private company con-
ducting business as an investment banker. Over a period of time the company and
its associates had been acquiring the securities of Rowan and Boden Ltd. Their
acquisitions were of such an amount as to bring them within the provisions of the
Code that require a general offer to be made to all shareholders [48]. The con-
trollers of D.F. Lyons persistently kept delaying this. The Chairman of D.F. Lyons
approached stockbrokers, Simon and Coates, and apparently instructed them to
find a purchaser for the relevant securities who would be willing to make a general
offer. The Panel accepted that, although the offeror is generally entitled to indulge
in market transactions unhampered by Rule 30, the position is otherwise where the
offeror is privy to confidential information including the intentions of a third
party. The Panel stated,
So far as his [Lyons'] offer was concerned there was no ban on market dealings. The offer, to
the preliminary discussions or intentions of which he was privy, was an offer by a third party,
which offer, although at the same figure as his own, might in the event be preferred by the
market - as indeed it was.
Thus when the Lyons company went into the market to acquire securities after this
date, they were in violation of Rule 30 since they dealt with knowledge of a pos-
sible offer by a third party. The Panel repeated its observation in the earlier case,
"It is axiomatic in the City, that inside information must never be used for personal
gain". The Panel stated that it was not necessary for them to decide whether the
disclosure of the plans to the market would have had a substantial impact on the
market price, or indeed whether anyone was damnified by the conduct of D.F.
Lyons, as Rule 30 contained an outright and absolute prohibition. The Panel
severely censured Mr. Lyons, who was the controller of D.F. Lyons, for his conduct
in the present case. In fact the Panel stated that it was their considered opinion that
"it would be contrary to the public interest for Mr. Lyons or his company to be
given a license to deal in securities" [49]. The Panel sent a copy of the Statement
to the Department of Trade [50].
Further violations of Rule 30 were exposed in the case of P.R. Grimnshawve and
Co. [51]. This company held 20% of the shares of Grimshawe-Windsor. It was
decided that the two companies should merge, by Grimshawe-Windsor making an
offer for the outstanding securities of P.R. Grimshawe and Co. To avoid the rule
against acquiring one's own shares, the offeree company decided to allow its 20%
holding in the offeror to be privately placed. However, about an eighth of these
securities were taken up by insiders of the offeree, who were well aware not only of
the impending merger but also of the effect this would have, when announced, on
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the price of the company's shares. The Panel "ordered" the insiders concerned to
repay their profits to the company, with the amount being fixed at the difference
between the placing price and the average market price during the first four days of
dealing after the end of the Stock Exchange's suspension, less the cost which would
have been incurred in selling the shares (a sum of £ 47,000). The profit was paid
back not by the insiders but by the merchant bank that had advised the parties con-
cerned, since the bank thought that it might appear that it had been inadvertent.
The insiders thus remained untouched and the deterrent effect of the Panel's State-
ment was frustrated.
The development of a stricter approach to insider trading by the Panel as well as
by the Appeal Committee was shown in the case of Mount Charlotte Investment
Ltd. and Gale Lister and Co. Ltd. [52]. Despite this stricter approach, however, the
outcome of this case raised questions about the Panel's effectiveness. The boards of
the two companies announced agreed terms for a merger and issued a joint state-
ment that P.R. Grimshawe had sold 200,000 Gale Lister securities for his own
account without the prior knowledge of the board of Gale Lister. The problem was
that P.R. Grimshawe was the financial adviser to Gale Lister and had publicly prom-
ised support for the bid. Referring to General Principles 1 and 3 of the Code, the
Panel expressed the view that a financial adviser should not deal with his securities
differently from the way he had advised the shareholders. The question was
whether P.R. Grimshawe (and in particular Peter Grimshawe, the managing direc-
tor), had behaved improperly in this respect. The Panel Executive made considerable
efforts to interview Mr. Grimshawe; in the end Grimshawe made a written reply, in
which he argued that the only rule that he could remotely be accused of violating
was Rule 31 (involving merely notices of trading to the Stock Exchange, the Panel
and the press). Grimshawe had argued that there was a difference between com-
mitting its clients' funds to a particular course as a merchant bank, and the commit-
ment of its own funds, and referred to the "Chinese Wall" concept. The Panel
rejected this, although endorsing the principle of segregation. In the result the Panel
decided that both Grirnshawe and his bank were deserving of "grave censure". The
Appeal Committee affirmed the decision of the Panel. It is not without interest that
before the Appeal Committee representatives of the merchant bank emphasized
that Peter Grimshawe had been removed from all executive functions in the bank,
and a solicitor appeared to state that attempts were being made to unseat Grim-
shawe from his directorships. In view of this, and the fact that the bank had been
unaware of the transactions, the Appeal Committee thought that the question of
the bank's license should not be specifically referred to the Department of Trade.
However, the Panel's Statement was sent to the Department and the question of
Peter Grimshawe' license and those of his companies was referred to the Depart-
ment [53].
The aftermath of the Panel's action raises questions about its effectiveness in this
case and points up the potential for public controversy. Within a month of Grim-
shawe's dismissal as chairman [54], he issued a public statement asserting that there
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had been "damaging and misleading statements made about him" which he strongly
objected to. He argued that his "personal position" had not been considered by the
Appeal Committee, and he had "suffered the Paners censure for an offense against
the general principles of the Code" (apparently meaning "only" against the general
principles). He added that,
I feel they have been unduly severe in the personal nature of the sentence. I am taking action
such as is available to me to clear my name [55].
The Department of Trade intimated to Grimshawe that they were seriously con-
sidering refusing to renew his license as a dealer in securities. However, on appeal to
a Special Tribunal set up by the Department of Trade to hear such cases he was
exonerated and it was recommended that his license be renewed, which in fact it
was [56].
At the same time Mr. Stephen Watling, who had been a director of Gale Lister,
made a public statement that it had been he who had suggested to Mr. Grimshawe
that the shares be sold. Simultaneously Grimshawe made another statement to the
effect that he had been unsuccessful in persuading the Appeal Committee to
reopen his case. He added that the Department of Trade's Special Tribunal "had
agreed that the Appeal Committee hearing was not an effective appeal". Mr.
Watling added that the Panel had refused to hear him or consider his statement and
that thus their decision had been "unjustified and unfair" [57]. It is not without
the greatest interest that Mr. Grimshawe, after all this, stated in the Financial Times
that
I am, however, satisfied that I have now cleared my name. So far as I am concerned the matter
is now closed and I can get on with the new businesses in which I am interested 1581.
Hardly an attestation to the Panel's effectiveness! Within 13 months Mr. Grimshawe
was, inter alia, Chairman of the Pennine Motor Group.
In the House of Fraser take-over, the Panel was less successful even in estab-
lishing that improper insider trading had occurred [59]. The Panel requested the
Stock Exchange to carry out an investigation into dealings in the shares of the
House of Fraser that had taken place prior to a public announcement of a take-over
offer [60]. The investigation showed that there were a number of transactions
which appeared to be significant, including purchases by a director, a personal assis-
tant, and other employees of the House of Fraser.
Among other transactions examined were those of Sir Hugh Fraser and his
family trusts. As these were sale transactions, and thus presumably against the im-
pact of the public announcement, the Panel stated,
[A]llihough constituting a technical breach of Rule 30 ... the Panel considered that these de,d
ings.., were not significant in the context of the enquiry.
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This approach has been criticized on the ground that it appears over-generous and
understanding to the "big names" in the City and industry.
The Panel concluded that the offeror "had maintained complete security
throughout the negotiations" but in view of the close connection between the com-
pany and many of the purchasers, it was unable to reach the same conclusion with
regard to the House of Fraser. Whilst it was not possible to identify the source of
the leak positively, it appeared certain that there had in fact been a leak, although
the identity of the potential offeror might not have been known [61]. The Panel
emphasized that
... there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that anyone was guilty of insider trading as
defined in the Code, but there are strong grounds for concluding that the House of Fraser did
not adequately observe the strict requirements of Rule 7 of the Code which stresses the need
for complete secrecy during bid negotiations [621.
The Panel added that it considered open to question
. .. the propriety of dealings by directors or close associates of directors of a company in the
shares of the company at a time when it is known that the Chairman is seeking a purchaser for
his holdings and that negotiations affecting the future of the company may take place... 1631.
In Dexion-Combio International Ltd., the Panel found that insider knowledge of
the accuracy of a publicized rumor was sufficient to violate the Code [64]. The
Stock Exchange conducted an investigation into dealings immediately preceding the
announcement of an agreed bid between Dexion and Interlake Inc. and passed the
findings on to the Panel. The investigation found that three days before the public
announcement, Mr. J.S. McKerchar, a Magistrate and man of some standing in the
City, visited Kleinwort Benson Ltd. (Dexion's merchant bank), to discuss the sug-
gestion that he become a director of the company. He was informed that the posi-
tion had changed because Dexion had received an offer. He was given no other
details, but the communication was made in such circumstances that, as McKerchar
admitted, there was a clear duty of confidentiality. Later on that day, he sought
information from his brokers as to the market in Dexion's securities. He was
informed that the market was fluctuating, since there were rumors that a public
offer was about to be made. Without giving the brokers any information,McKerchar
instructed them to buy for his own account 20,000 ordinary shares in Dexion, to
hold them for a week, and then to sell out. The brokers complied with this; in fact
the shares were sold at a substantial profit three days after the public announce-
ment.
On returning from holiday, MeKerchar discovered that the Panel and the Stock
Exchange were making investigations. He wrote to Kleinwort Benson Ltd., explain-
ing the circumstances of the transaction and claiming that in view of the sharp rise
in the price of the securities he had thought that the likelihood of the offer was
public knowledge. Given his mistake he promised that his profit would be given to
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charity [65]. The Panel thought that there had been a clear violation of Rule 30:
[Elven if there were rumours that a bid was to be made, Mr. McKerchar knew that the rumours
were in fact true. He was thus an insider, in a better position than other investors who had at
most heard rumours.
The Stock Exchange investigation committee's report stated that "some of those
who dealt may have had advance information of a privileged nature" [661.
The Panel was influenced by the fact that when McKerchar entered into the
transaction he did so "without giving serious thought at the time to the grave im-
plications under the City Code". Furthermore, he was a man of proven integrity
and had come forward on hearing about the investigation. Thus the Panel merely
reprimanded him and endorsed his donation of £ 2,000 to a charity approved by
the Panel. Although giving "careful and sympathetic consideration" to McKerchar's
position, the Appeal Committee affirmed the decision of the Panel that the facts of
the case should be made publicly known [67].
The obligation of a tippee to act in accordance with the Code was examined by
the Panel with respect to the public offer by Hewden-Stuart Plant Ltd. for A. Gunn
(Holdings) Ltd. [68]. Here again both the Panel and the Stock Exchange had ini-
tiated investigations because of dramatic price rises just prior to the announcement
of a public offer. It appeared that on the afternoon of Sunday, June 8, 1976, cer-
tain directors of A. Gunn (Holdings) Ltd. were meeting to discuss the proposed
merger, which had not yet been announced. Mr. D.M. Gunn, the joint managing
director, was due at a wedding later that afternoon. When it became apparent that
he would have to forego attending the ceremony, and attend only the reception, he
telephoned his host, Mr. S.S. Ordman, to inform him of this. By way of explanation
Gunn added that "he was involved in merger discussions". That evening Ordman
ordered his stockbroker, who was present at the reception, to acquire £ 5,000
worth of Gunn shares on his account. The Panel stated that whilst they could
sympathize with Mr. Gunn's desire to explain and justify his forced absence from
the ceremony, he had nonetheless behaved "indiscreetly" and was deserving of a
reprimand for failing to observe Rule 7. The Panel added,
[A]lthough Mr. Ordman was not in any way connected with Gunn or the proposed offer for
Gunn and therefore could not be said to fall within the provisions of Rule 30, the Panel con-
siders that he knew or ought to have known that he received the information in confidence and
that it was not to be acted upon.
Thus the Panel stated its disapproval, although Mr. Ordman retained his £ 1,100
profit.
The full force of the Panel's authority was seen in the recent case of Ultra Elec-
tronic Holdings Ltd. [69], where the Panel and Appeal Committee severely cen-
sured a director of an investment company who had engaged in personal dealings
on the basis of knowledge that a bid was imminent for a company in which his
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company was a substantial shareholder. In addition the Panel "ordered" him to pay
his profit of £ 7,000 to an approved charity. Similarly, in the case of C.H. Johnson
and Sons Ltd. [701 an employee of a bank, which was involved in the negotiations
for a public offer, traded through a nominee on the basis of inside information. The
Panel named the individual concerned, who lost his job, and "ordered" him to pay
his profit to a charity. It should be noted that the employee had co-operated fully
with the Panel in this case.
In JB. Eastwood Ltd. [71], a director of Eastwood learned that an American
corporation was interested in making a very favorable offer for Eastwood. The
director placed an order with his broker for 10,000 shares in his company in the
name of his wife. He notified the company after this order had been executed. East-
wood had adopted the Stock Exchange's Model Code on Directors Dealings [72]
and thus his conduct was clearly in breach of the rules that this Code prescribes.
First, he should not have dealt on the basis, or at least whilst in possession, of inside
information. Second, he should not have dealt during a period of two months im-
mediately preceding the preliminary announcement of the company's annual
results; this he had done by placing his order when he did. Third, he should have
notified the chairman of his company before he dealt. It is interesting that as soon
as Eastwood's chairman became aware of the facts an internal investigation was
instituted with the assistance of the company's merchant bank. The director
resigned his directorship and left the employment of the company. The Panel in its
statement identified him and publicly censured him for his breach of Rule 30 and
the Stock Exchange's Model Code. The director publicly expressed his regret and
volunteered to surrender his profit to a charity.
Yet another illustration of the Panel's ability to deal more or less effectively
with insider dealing is shown in the Panel's statement on Chaddesley Investments
Ltd. [73]. In a strongly worded statement, the Panel found that a director of the
Schlesinger Group had violated the spirit if not the letter of Rule 30. It appears that
the director advised a South African client of Schlesinger to purchase shares in
Chaddesley Investments on the basis of privileged information. A substantial share-
holder of Chaddesley had been approached by another company with the intention
of acquiring its holding in Chaddesley. The director in question had been appointed
agent of the substantial shareholder for the purpose of negotiating this transaction.
It should be noted that the director was closely associated with Chaddesley, as one
of Schlesinger's subsidiaries held about sixteen percent of Chaddesley's shares, and
in addition managed the group's property portfolio. The director argued that, at the
time he advised his client to acquire shares in Chaddesley, there was no definite or
firm offer in existence and thus there was no "bid" within the terms of Rule 30.
The Panel stated,
The Panel finds it difficult to accept such a contention in the circumstances. It is true that the
Rule does not refer specifically to the sale of shares which may lead to a mandatory offer, that
it forbids the release of information relating to the potential offer, rather than specifically for-
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bidding the giving of advice based on that information, and that it contemplates the insider
himself dealing in the shares. The Rule, like the rest of the Code, is not expressed in precise
detailed language, it is expressly stated and has been repeatedly emphasised that the spirit of
the Code must be observed, as [the director] has acknowledged... Rule 30 is specifically con-
cerned with an insider dealing in shares, but it cannot be accepted ... that an insider escapes
criticism if he advises someone else to deal.
The Panel also noted that at the relevant time "Schlesingers had failed to separate
corporate finance functions from investment advisory functions", and welcomed
the fact that Schlesinger had now introduced internal arrangements designed to
prevent a repetition of this. Whilst the Panel accepted that the transaction involved
no personal gain for the director it felt it necessary to "record its strong disapproval
of the action which" he had taken.
Where the participants in the transaction are outside the Panel's jurisdiction
understandably there have been problems. However, the Panel's statement on Sime
Darby Holdings Ltd. does show the determination of the Panel to uncover insider
trading abuses, even though the transactions might have occurred abroad [74]. In
this case the Panel severely censured two named persons for insider trading and
expressed the view that one was unfitted to be a director of a public company. In
addition the Panel criticized a director of a leading merchant bank for allegedly
turning a blind eye to probable violations of the Code [75]. A recent case where
the Panel was unable to deal effectively with a case of insider trading involving
persons outside its jurisdiction is that of Dunford and Elliott Ltd. [76]. The share
price of Dunford and Elliott's ordinary shares moved upwards significantly, just
before the public announcement that talks were taking place with another company
which might lead to an offer being made for Dunford and Elliott's shares. At the
request of the Panel the Stock Exchange investigated dealings in the issuer during
the relevant period. It was found that 105,000 shares had been purchased by three
Swiss banks. It is perhaps worth reproducing here the Panel's comments on this:
In correspondence which has taken place over many months the Panel executive has been told
by each of the banks concerned that Swiss banking laws prevent them from disclosing to third-
parties the identity of their clients without the clients' permission. At the request of the Panel
the banks sought the permission of their clients for their identities to be disclosed to the Panel,
but in each case the clients had refused to grant their permission. The banks have thus had no
alternative but to decline to name their clients. They have, however, all confirmed that the
clients for whom these shares were purchased are not residents of the United Kingdom. This
case provides a particularly stark example of one of the problems encountered in the course
of share dealing investigation.
The Panel and Stock Exchange are not, of course, the only regulatory authorities
in this field that have been faced with the practical problem of Swiss banking
secrecy and indeed foreign nominee accounts [77]. This is a problem that does not
admit of an easy answer for any kind of authority whether possessed of legal
powers of investigation or not [78].
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There have been a number of other cases where allegations of insider trading
have been made. Violations of Rule 30 have been found in some, while in others
the Panel has made a number of investigations in which it has found no evidence of
insider trading by identifiable individuals even though there appeared to have been
a leakage of price-sensitive information to outsiders [79].
4. The effectiveness of the Panel
From the sample of the Panel's cases discussed above it is possible to make some
evaluation of the effectiveness of the sanctions available. The most important sanc-
tion is that of disclosure and the public disgrace that may be attendant thereupon.
Disclosure as a sanction can be a rather blunt instrument and it is impossible to esti-
mate with any degree of precision its ultimate effect. In other cases disclosure may
be a two-edged sword. Where the person who is the object of the criticism is in a
position to launch a counter-disclosure campaign, as has been done in a number of
recent cases, the regulatory effects of the initial disclosure may be negatived.
Indeed, public opinion may be turned against the regulatory authority making the
initial disclosure. Regulatory authorities such as the Panel have only limited
resources and are hardly well placed to engage in a public controversy through the
mass media. Disclosure in this context is purely a punitive sanction and may only
indirectly benefit the market.
The threat of public censure or some other form of sanction has been used by
the Panel to persuade some traders to pay to charities the profits they have made
through share transactions. Whilst a commendable sanction, there are certain objec-
tions to it in practice. First there is the tax advantage enjoyed by those making
charitable gifts. Second there is a degree of public esteem that attaches to those
who make such gifts. Finally this sanction in no way helps those investors who may
have been injured by the violation of the Code.
In many cases the Panel has been willing to refer cases to its constituent self-
regulatory authorities for action. Certainly today the Panel can legitimately expect
close co-operation from these and other associated bodies, although this has not
always been so. The sanctions applied by these bodies are of a professional disci-
plinary nature and are confined to persons owing professional allegiance to them.
On rare occasions the Panel has also referred cases to the Department of Trade,
usually in connection with the suitability of a person to hold or be given a license
to deal in securities under the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958.
Although there are cases where the department has appointed inspectors inter alia
on the recommendation of the Panel, it is open to question how much support it
has actually given the Panel.
Listed companies have had their quotation suspended by the Stock Exchange on
a number of occasions. The Panel and the Stock Exchange have publicly asserted
that this expedient will be used more commonly in the context of take-over opera-
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tions and announcements of price-sensitive information. Although in many
instances a suspension has been imposed at the request of a company itself, a sus-
pension or a threat of suspension can also be used as a sanction in certain instances.
It is hard to envisage the circumstances justifying a delisting, although this too is a
possible sanction.
5. Market surveillance and investigation
The City Panel on Take-overs and Mergers does not operate a market surveil-
lance program directed towards the detection of insider trading. Where a take-over
bid is pending the Panel will instruct the participants and their advisers to keep an
eye on the stock market [80], and of course the press will be alert to suspicious
dealings [81]. Where there is an allegation of improper trading or where the Panel
itself becomes suspicious the Executive might check the relevant prices, but this is
the extent of organized surveillance from the Panel's end.
The Stock Exchange does operate a market surveillance program, but it is rudi-
mentary. Indeed before 1974 scant if any attention was given to market surveil-
lance, as it is understood with regard to anti-insider trading regulation [82]. The
present author was informed by the Stock Exchange in March, 1975:
[Tlhe people who carry out the equivalent of the stock watch system here in London work
wholly either from our market display system, which shows price movements in 700 leading
securities [83], or from material gathered by our Official List Department which compiles the
official record which is published daily [841.
Given the traditional jobbing system there is no consolidated transaction tape, as on
most developed securities markets throughout the world, and indeed no real possi-
bility of one being devised [85]. In fact, marking of bargains, the basis of the
Official Record, is still voluntary. With the current debate on the adequacy of self-
regulation there has been a growing awareness in the City that the present scheme
of market surveillance is hardly adequate; attempts have recently been made to
improve the present procedures.
The Exchange might be alerted to the possibility of improper trading from a
number of sources, such as complaints from outsiders and company managements,
the Panel, the financial institutions and in particular jobbers and brokers. When
suspicious trading is discovered, the normal procedure is to appoint an ad hoc inves-
tigation committee, composed of some two to four members of the Stock Ex-
change who serve part-time and without pay. The decision whether to appoint a
committee is entirely up to the Exchange, and it is free to choose to investigate
complaints through preliminary investigations to determine whether or not a com-
mittee is warranted. It must be emphasized that the Stock Exchange is entirely a
private institution, under no obligation to carry out investigations.
Until recently investigation committees would never interview members of the
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general public and, although co-operation and assistance were expected from those
active in the securities industry, direct evidence was generally obtained only from
members of the Stock Exchange. Under Rule 15 of the Stock Exchange all mem-
bers are under an obligation to attend upon the Council and its committees "and
give such information as may be in their possession relative to any matter under
investigation" [86]. Lists of transactions can thus be obtained from jobbers, and
the relevant brokers identified. Of course where nominees are involved both the
broker and the Stock Exchange are likely to face considerable problems and in any
case much depends upon the memories of the individuals consulted.
Upon completion the committee's report is submitted to the Council of the
Stock Echange and in appropriate cases the Council passes a copy to the City Panel.
Where there are suspicious dealings by persons whom the Stock Exchange cannot
relate to the company, the Exchange and the Panel may send details of such trans-
actions to the chairmen of the companies involved. Given the fear of possible libel
actions, the exposing of brokers to actions by their clients for breach of confidence
and the admittedly limited nature of the Stock Exchange's investigatory jurisdic-
tion, the Exchange until recently did not make copies of its reports generally avail-
able. Since 1974 the Exchange has sought to take a much tougher line with possible
cases of insider trading and has made it clear that its investigations and their results
would in future attract a greater degree of publicity. Certainly since 1974 the Stock
Exchange has been far more open in announcing the establishment of investiga-
tions. However, very few reports have been published [871, and the vast majority
of investigations appear to be either inconclusive or to show no identifiable insider
activity.
The Panel and Executive are thus dependent upon the ability of the Stock
Exchange and its investigation committees to provide a detailed reconstruction of
the market and to identify those trading therein [88]. On the basis of the Stock
Exchange's report the Executive may invite the relevant stockbroker to bring his
client before them or the Panel, but this is done in only a small proportion of cases.
The Panel's inquiries have been frustrated by nominees and, in a few cases, lack of
co-operation. The Panel has also had to contend with situations almost devoid of
rational assessment [89].
Whilst the Panel and the Executive do not object to a person being accompanied
by his legal adviser, the Panel does not allow the legal adviser to act as an advocate.
Given the high calibre of lawyers on the Panel and in the Executive this must place
the lay outsider at a considerable disadvantage in his appearance before the Panel.
The Panel has been far less concerned than the Stock Exchange about the laws of
libel (although it does maintain a substantial indemnity insurance cover) and has
been much more prepared to publicize its findings.
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6. Adequacy of self-regulation
It is not altogether clear that it would be fair to judge the present structure of
self-regulation in the British securities industry by the performance of the City
Panel on Take-overs and Mergers. Certainly the Panel has proved to be the best
example of working self-regulation in an admittedly difficult area. In dealing with
the problem of insider trading the Panel has shown the strengths and weaknesses
of the present regulatory scheme. There is a degree of flexibility, but also profound
evidentiary problems and few directly calculable sanctions. In fact, both the City
Panel and the Stock Exchange have acknowledged the deficiencies of self-regulation
in this respect; in a joint statement published in February, 1973, they called for
insider trading to be outlawed by legislation and for investigatory and enforcement
powers to be vested in the police [90].
Some of the alleged advantages and disadvantages of a self-regulatory structure
in general, and occasionally as applied to the British system, can be listed as fol-
lows:
(A) Advantages of self-regulation
(a) The persons concerned with self-regulation are often experts in the area, and
indeed are often at the pinnacle of their profession.
(b) From the standpoint of the taxpayer, an efficient system of self-regulation is
inexpensive. Furthermore, it reflects the notion that those who use the market
place should contribute to the cost of its maintenance.
(c) A self-regulatory system can be administered more quickly and flexibly than
one that must operate according to legal procedures and technical rules.
(d) Since the rules are non-legal they can be amended to accommodate develop-
ments with a minimum degree of trouble.
(e) Given the status of self-regulatory norms, it is possible to favor the spirit of the
rule over its literal wording.
(f) The question of motivation can be considered to a far greater extent than
where a tribunal is administering laws.
(g) Legal definitions are not sufficiently flexible to accommodate the variety of
situations, such as insider trading, that arise in the area of securities regulation.
(h) Self-regulation encourages strong professional integrity and discipline within
the profession.
(i) Legal regulation must be content with the bare minimum of acceptable con-
duct, whereas self-regulatory norms can operate from a higher threshold.
(j) Self-regulation helps to avoid the "them" and "us" feeling between the regula-
tors and those for whom they are responsible.
(k) Since the basis of self-regulation is consent, the impact of regulation can be
extended beyond legal jurisdiction, particularly to foreigners.
(1) Self-regulation is better able to take account of general or primary policies and
objectives than legal regulation.
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(m) Since self-regulators invariably work on an informal basis they tend to be more
prepared to "stick their necks out" and give assistance in situations where a
legal agency more directly accountable to a superior would be inhibited.
(n) People are on the whole more likely to respond to requests than orders.
(o) In real terms the sanctions of disapproval and damaged reputations which lie in
the field of self-regulation are far greater than any legal sanction.
(B) Disadvantages of self-regulation
(a) Self-regulators appear to act as judge and jury in their own cause.
(b) Since the major sanction available in self-regulation is exclusion of the wrong-
doer from securities activities, its effectiveness depends upon the credibility of
the threat of exclusion. This in turn depends upon the determination of the
regulators and the desire of the regulated to avoid being excluded.
(c) Since jurisdiction is based upon actual or imputed consent, it is both objection-
able and impractical to try to extend it to those who are not among the constit-
uents of the regulator.
(d) There is a potential for conflict of interest between members of the self-regu-
latory body and outsiders who deal with such members, despite a certain
degree of identity of interest.
(e) Because the self-regulatory agencies do not generally possess a legal basis they
do not possess the legal powers that would enable them to deal with outsiders.
(f) There is uncertainty as to whether many self-regulatory agencies possess quali-
fied privilege from liability for defamation.
(g) Self-regulation can be expensive and wasteful because of unnecessary duplica-
tion and conflicting approaches.
(h) Regulators may be appointed because of their social pre-eminence or prestige
rather than for their administrative qualities.
(i) Since the public at large inevitably benefits from public confidence in the
securities markets through increased capital investment, it is not necessary that
the expense of regulating and maintaining the securities industry be borne only
by direct users of the market.
(.) Given the lack of external accountability and surveillance it is difficult to
determine whether there are very few instances of actual abuse or whether the
self-regulatory agency is merely inept in detecting and exposing them.
(k) Because of the fragmentation of authority among self-regulatory agencies, it
is difficult for an outsider (or indeed an official regulator at home or abroad)
to know with whom to deal. Furthermore, since the self-regulatory agencies are
essentially private bodies there is no obligation to co-operate with them even if
contact is established.
(1) The vague jurisdictional basis possessed by the self-regulatory agencies can give
rise to serious difficulties if their position is challenged in the courts. Similar
problems can arise regarding the application of the rules of natural justice and
proper process.
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(m) There are gaps in the self-regulatory network, particularly in the area of new
professions and services.
(n) The present system of self-regulation has been built upon the basis of a cen-
tralized or predominant securities market in the City of London. This could be
challenged by the development of a more substantial over-the-counter market,
particularly along the lines of ARIEL, and by developments within the EEC.
(o) A primary facet of the self-regulation of the City was the strong social and cul-
tural bond cementing the members (the "old boy" or "old school tie"
approach) which has diminished considerably in recent years.
(p) The vast increase of foreign interests which do not necessarily share the same
social or moral ethics as those who have traditionally dealt with the City makes
implementation of social pressure sanctions less effective.
(q) Law is, at least in theory, more certain and predictable than self-regulation; in a
climate of fierce international competition more certain legal rules might be
preferred, even at the risk of sacrificing "higher ethics".
(r) Self-regulation does not provide a single authoritative voice capable of calling
for tile legislation that is necessary to deal with areas where regulation has
failed. This is particularly evident in the case of insider trading.
(s) There is no clear delineation of responsibility among the existing agencies. This
tends towards a degree of ignorance about the responsibilities and aims of each
body, which in turn leads to criticism of the agencies for their failure to deal
with certain matters even though they do not have jurisdiction, authority or
expertise with respect to those matters.
(t) It is questionable how flexible the self-regulators actually are. Although they
may well have great expertise in their own function, they may be wholly igno-
rant of related fields and lack co-ordination with other agencies responsible for
particular areas. Indeed, different agencies may come to contradictory deci-
sions.
(u) Because of a tendency in recent years for securities frauds to stretch across
national boundaries, it would be preferable for both foreign and domestic
agencies to be able to deal with a central authority in the United Kingdom. The
lack of such an authority has created problems in the drafting of EEC legisla-
tion.
7. The future
A primary consideration running throughout the foregoing arguments is the
overriding need to preserve and foster investor confidence in the securities markets
[91 ]. There is a feeling that the performance of the Panel and the Stock Exchange
with regard to insider trading has not been an adequate substitute for legal regula-
tion. Stock Exchange investigations lack an obvious factor of objectivity and there
is always the danger of allegations of "white-washing". The present author has
argued elsewhere for the creation of a statutory Securities Industry Commission,
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with legal powers of investigation and regulation, which would incorporate the
present self-regulatory authorities as delegates of the Commission [92]. However,
it appears that at least in Britain the government is not averse to allowing a modi-
fied form of self-regulation to continue [93].
There has been much recent activity in Britain designed to improve the regula-
tion of securities transactions. In October. 1976 the Government set up a Com-
mittee of Inquiry under the controversial chairmanship of Sir Harold Wilson to
examine the functioning and supervision of the British capital markets. The Secre-
tary of State for Trade has established a joint review committee of officers from the
Department of Trade and Bank of England to keep the present system of regulation
in the securities industry under constant review. Specific legislation on insider
trading has also been promised in the near future [941. The City has recently made
considerable efforts to tighten up its self-regulatory control to avoid the creation of
a Securities and Exchange Commission. The efforts of the Panel and Stock Ex-
change with regard to insider trading have already been discussed. The accountancy
profession, after a considerable degree of public criticism, is attempting to recon-
stitute its self-regulatory authority and improve its own surveillance and disciplin-
ary procedures [95].
Undoubtedly the most dramatic development has been the adoption by the City
institutions of the main recommendations made by the Director General of the
Take-over Panel's Executive and the Deputy Chief Executive of the Stock Exchange,
in their confidential report on the regulation of the British securities industry. This
has involved the creation of an entirely new self-regulatory authority called the
Council for the Securities Industry (C.S.I.) [96]. The C.S.I. is built around the
existing self-regulatory machinery of the Stock Exchange, and in particular the
Quotations Department of the Stock Exchange and the Panel on Take-overs and
Mergers. The various self-regulatory authorities retain their jurisdiction in their par-
ticular areas of competence. The Bank of England, which is the driving force behind
the Council, has set out its objects as follows [97]:
(a) To maintain the highest ethical standards in the conduct of business within the
securities industry.
(b) To keep under constant review the evolution of the securities industry, market
practice and related codes of conduct and to scrutinise the effectiveness of
existing forms of regulation and the machinery for their administration.
(c) To maintain arrangements for the investigation of cases of alleged misconduct
within the securities industry and breaches of codes of conduct or best practice
and to keep these arrangements under review.
(d) To initiate new policies and codes as necessary concerning activities in the secu-
rities industry other than those properly within the domestic province of each
individual constituent member.
(e) To resolve differences on matters of principle between constituent parts of the
securities industry.
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(f) To ensure liaison with the European Commission on securities industry matters
and the implementation of the E.E.C. Capital Markets Code of Conduct.
(g) To consider the need for changes in legislation affecting the activities of the
securities industry and to examine any proposals for such legislation.
The Council is composed of representatives from the securities industry with a
token representation of outside interests [98]. Its secretariat consists of three indi-
viduals. The real work of the Council is in the hands of two major committees,
namely the Markets Committee and the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers. The
Markets Committee is really little more than the old City Working Party, which was
responsible for the Code on Take-overs and Mergers. In addition to this responsibil-
ity the Committee is concerned with the preparation of other codes of conduct and
comments on various matters of interest to the securities industry. The Panel
remains unchanged in both its authority and operations. There is a considerable
feeling, both inside and outside the City, that the C.S.I. has yet to prove itself. The
only visible role it has played during its first year is to publish two statements on
the proposed legislation for insider trading. The first merely echoed the general
view that it is wrong and that legislation is required; and the second voiced certain
objections to the wording of the Government's proposed legislation. Neither docu-
ment can really be described as significant.
Whilst the present author welcomes the City's attempt to "put its own house in
order" by the creation of the C.S.I. there is a very real danger that the entire exer-
cise might with some justification be dismissed by the City's critics as wholly cos-
metic. Perhaps even more disturbing is the rather cool reception the Chairman of
the Stock Exchange has given to the Government's proposals to deal with insider
trading [99]. Even more surprising has been the attack on the City institutions by
the Conservative Party for not opposing the present Government's proposals more
enthusiastically. It should be remembered that the Conservative Government in
1973 introduced into Parliament provisions which were arguably as far-reaching as
the present Government's, if not more so. Now, however, the Conservatives would
seem to consider that insider trading should in large measure be left to the City,
possibly with some express civil remedy provided through legislation for aggrieved
investors. Should insider trading become a crime, albeit only in limited circum-
stances, it is unlikely to affect substantially the way in which the Panel conducts its
affairs and supervision over the securities industry. Arguably, the fact that insider
trading has been declared unlawful will strengthen the Panel's hand, but by the
same token it could result in people being far less prepared to "come clean".
Indeed, this is one of the fears of the Chairman of the Stock Exchange, who, per-
haps with justification, considers that investors and professionals will be far less
willing to co-operate with the self-regulatory agencies if there is a prospect, albeit
extremely remote, that criminal charges might follow. On their own the law
enforcement agencies would never be in a position to detect a case of insider trad-
ing, let alone investigate it. Without a proper system of market surveillance the self-
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regulatory authorities have a difficult enough task in this regard. Thus in the result,
it is unlikely that the role of the Panel in the regulation of take-overs and mergers,
and in particular insider trading, will alter substantially in the foreseeable future.
The Panel has proved itself to be as effective a regulator as any other anywhere else
in the world, and it would be an act of sheer folly to undermine this.
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Author's note
The present article was at proof stage during the passage through the House of
Commons of the 1978 Companies Bill which interalia would have rendered insider
trading a criminal offense. Of course, with the fall of the Labour Government in the
Spring of 1979 this Bill failed to pass into law. However, it is known that the pres-
ent Government is preparing a bill which will seek to outlaw insider trading presum-
ably providing both civil and criminal sanctions. The comments in the present arti-
cle relating to the 1978 Bill should therefore be viewed in the light of this note.
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